MYTH: Buffalo is going to beat us. It's Detroit vs. Buffalo

Snyder argued that without swift action in the state legislature, Michigan could lose international trade because eventually there could be another crossing near Niagara and going through New York.

Rick Snyder, MLIVE



DRAFT

Border Crossings Workshop

February 23, 2005





MYTH:

Michigan & New York are in Competition

Myth Debunked: Michigan & New York are in Competition

- Different trade corridors
- Different markets for commodities
- No indication of traffic shift from new crossing
- Working closely to increase federal funding
- Both new crossings needed to support economic growth of region
- Southwestern Ontario land bridge between Michigan & New York

Michigan & New York Crossings Serve Very Different Markets



Shortest Miles – Michigan vs. New York



June 06, 2011 11:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Fitch Affirms Peace Bridge, NY's $40.6MM Rev Rfdg Bonds at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Fitch Ratings has affirmed the unenhanced long-term 'A-' rating on approximately $40.6 million of Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority, NY (the authority) toll bridge system revenue refunding bonds, series 2005. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

RATING RATIONALE:

--Importance of the facility (the Peace Bridge) to the Niagara regional transportation network with 6.02 million transactions in 2010, one of the lowest levels since 1979. The recent traffic declines were attributed to depressed economic conditions and the availability of nearby competing facilities.

--Toll rate increases on the Peace Bridge have not impacted its revenue profile; moderate rate-making flexibility exists.

--The authority has had strong historical financial performance with debt service coverage of at least 2.84 times (x) since 2000 and has actively managed its expenditures with a 2005-2010 compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of less than 2%.

--The Peace Bridge is dependent on commercial traffic volume for toll revenues comprising approximately 70% in 2010.

--Only one of three competing facilities allows commercial traffic, but it recently implemented an automatic crossing system for trucks and tour buses which may possibly compete with the Peace Bridge's E-ZPass system.

KEY RATING DRIVERS:

--Traffic performance on the Peace Bridge due to the implementation of the automatic crossing system on competing bridges and the resulting effect on toll revenues.

--The authority expects to undertake bridge capacity enhancements that are likely to occur before the 2025 maturity of the currently outstanding bonds. These enhancements could possibly result in a significantly larger debt burden and lower coverage of debt service for the authority.

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PLEASE

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MYTH: The State will lose federal road funding if we don't build the Government Bridge.

AMBASSADOR BRIDGE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES UNDER REVIEW BY BDO SEIDMAN

CALENDAR YEAR	EXISTING BRIDGE ACTUAL	COMBINED EXISTING BRIDGE & TWIN SPAN PROJECTED
1992	$1,916,227	
1993	$10,441,493	
1994	$1,705,432	
1995	$5,379,316	
1996	$5,448,636	
1997	$4,037,127	
1998	$5,885,405	
1999	$8,840,212	
2000	$9,015,233	
2001	$8,961,236	
2002	$8,240,196	
2003	$4,331,425	
2004	$8,284,499	
2005	$1,873,178	
2006	$15,120,759	
2007	$67,445,858	
2008	$33,736,655	
2009	$35,701,371	
2010	$7,540,374	
2011	$20,000,000	$40,401,000
2012		$81,860,000
2013		$103,860,000
2014		$131,460,000
2015		$131,200,000
2016		$80,900,000
2017		$6,100,000
2018		$6,700,000
2019		$6,350,000
2020		$6,750,000
2021		$4,050,000
Multi-years Software Projects	$3,663,670	
	$267,568,302	**$599,631,000**
TOTAL	**$867,199,302**	

*Ambassador Bridge Twin Span expenditures included in 2012-2016 years.

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration

Michigan Division

315 W. Allegan Street, Room 201
Lansing, MI 48933
517-377-1844 (office)
517-377-1804 (fax)
Michigan.FHWA@dot.gov

May 18, 2011

In Reply Refer To:
HDA-MI

Mr. Myron G. Frierson
Bureau Director, Finance and Administration (B480)
Michigan Department of Transportation
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Frierson:

We have reviewed the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) request, dated May 3, 2011, for approval of additional toll credits earned for capital outlay expenditures by the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC). The additional toll credits are for DIBC toll revenue expenditures in years 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2008 in which MDOT has satisfied the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) determination as required by 23 U.S.C. §120(j)(2).

Based upon your certification regarding these toll credits and the previous MOE determinations, we are approving MDOT's request. MDOT's credit amount of $50,639,839 may be applied toward the non-Federal matching share of programs authorized by Title 23, U.S.C, except for projects funded with FHWA's emergency relief funds. Additionally, the credit may be applied to transit programs authorized by Chapter 53 of Title 49, U.S.C.

Please contact Eric Purkiss at (517) 702-1848 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Theodore G. Burch

Theodore G. Burch, P.E.
Assistant Division Administrator

For: Russell L. Jorgenson
Division Administrator

MYTH: Back -ups at the Ambassador Bridge take hours. "Worst bottleneck in North America"

(www.ambassadorbridge.com)

MYTH: The Ambassador Bridge is the wrong location to invest in.












NOLAN

DRIC – 2006 MDOT Salt Mines

cc: Mohammad

MDOT
Michigan Department of Transportation

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: January 27, 2006

TO: Larry E. Tibbits
Chief Operations Officer

FROM: John C. Friend
Engineer of Delivery

Brenda J. O'Brien
Engineer of Construction and Technology

2/14/06

SUBJECT: Detroit River International Crossing – Geotechnical Design Policy

This memo is to request approval of a geotechnical design policy for the Detroit River International Crossing (DRIC). As part of the early preliminary engineering study for the DRIC, consultants working for MDOT and Canada investigated the location and potential impact salt solution mines may have on the project. The area beneath Detroit and Windsor, especially near the Detroit River, has been historically mined for salt, often using solution mining methods. Solution mining involves drilling wells down to stratum containing salt, typically about 1,200 feet below ground surface. Water is pumped down the well to dissolve the salt, and then returned to the surface where the salt is recovered. Solution mining creates large caverns where the salt deposits have been removed. Caverns from adjacent wells often coalesce to produce composite caverns called galleries. The uncertain shape and size of the caverns combined with variability in the rock properties, fissures, and geological formations above, have resulted in instability and collapse of rock layers that form the roof of the cavern. This internal collapse of the rock structure at depths between 1,100 and 1,200 feet can reflect back to the ground surface producing sinkholes. In fact, roof collapses have caused sinkholes in some of the areas included in the DRIC study. In 1954, a roof collapse of a solution mine resulted in the rapid development of a sinkhole beneath the Canadian Industries Limited (CIL) complex, which was located in west Windsor at Sandwich Street and Prospect Avenue. The sinkhole disrupted industry, endangered the public, and forced evacuation of office buildings in the CIL complex as they settled. The incident was widely publicized at the time making front page news "all over the world." In 1994, a roof collapse of a salt mine caused ground subsidence and the collapse of a bridge carrying State Route 20A near Cuylerville, New York.

The bridge crossing the Detroit River will be a long span structure designed using AASHTO's LRFD code and a comparable Canadian code. Due to the size, complexity, strategic importance, and extreme capital investment of a long span bridge, unique safety factors must be used to achieve stringent reliability levels and the desired design life of the investment. Modern bridge design codes use reliability theory to calibrate load and resistance factors so that each component of the structure will provide uniform safety levels and long-term maintainability. The foundation materials are a very important component of the structure and are also subject to the same

DRIC050812

reliability based requirements. The lack of experience, knowledge of the materials, and failure mechanisms associated with salt mine cavern failures make it improbable that a reliability based design can be done if the foundations of the bridge are placed within the influence of a salt mine cavern. Long-span bridges typically must be designed as a non-redundant, fracture critical structure; therefore, subsidence of the foundation material beneath the main span's primary substructure units will almost certainly result in catastrophic failure. Ground subsidence beneath the approach span substructure units can also result in a collapse of the superstructure above.

The consultant documents produced during the study have shown that, most often, attempts to mitigate ground subsidence beneath engineered structures have been unsuccessful, resulting in eventual abandonment of the project or relocation of the structure. It is also improbable that the caverns can cost-effectively be mitigated by grouting, due to the unpredictable size and connectivity of adjacent caverns. The most likely results will be large cost over runs and failure to confidently achieve the safety factors needed for a structure of this magnitude and importance.

Therefore, we recommend the following geotechnical design policy for the DRIC:

1. **All bridge foundations shall be founded on continuously competent bedrock.**
2. **The location of all primary and secondary substructure units shall be placed safely beyond the failure influence of any salt mine caverns.**

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact us.

John C Friend
Engineer of Delivery

Brenda J. O'Brien
Engineer of Construction and Technology

BOHD:C&T:DAJ:clc

cc: S. Mortel
P. O'Rourke
D. Endres

DRIC050813

DRIC – 2006 MDOT Salt Mines

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Engineer of Delivery

Engineer of Construction and Technology

BOHD:C&T:DAJ:slc

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DRIC050813

DRIC – 2006 MDOT Salt Mines

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Engineer of Delivery

Engineer of Construction and Technology

BOHD:C&T:DAJ:clc

cc: S. Mortel
F. O'Rourke
D. Endres

DRIC050813

DRIC – 2006 MDOT Salt Mines

Larry Tibbits Page 2 of 2 January 27, 2006

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Engineer of Construction and Technology

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cc: S. Mortel
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DRIC050813

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If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact us.

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BOHD:C&T:DAJ:clc

cc: S. Mortel
P. O'Rourke
D. Endres

DRIC050813

MYTH: The Gateway Project was only about accommodating ramps.

2. Agreement on PROJECT design concept. The PARTIES are in agreement with the PROJECT design concept depicted in EXHIBIT I. The PARTIES agree that the PROJECT meets the objectives as identified in the GATEWAY STUDY, as follows:

A. Improve direct access between the BRIDGE and the state trunkline system, including Clark and Fort Streets and I-75 and I-96.

B. Accommodate a potential future second span of the BRIDGE.

C. Accommodate access to a proposed welcome center at the U.S. entrance to

authorized officials for the DIBC and the DEPARTMENT; upon adoption of a resolution approving said AGREEMENT and authorizing the signature thereto of the official of the DIBC, a certified copy of which resolution shall be attached to this AGREEMENT; and with approval by the State Administrative Board.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the PARTIES have caused their respective officers, duly authorized, to execute this AGREEMENT as of the date first above written.

DETROIT INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE COMPANY

BY _____

TITLE President

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BY _____

TITLE Director

THE FOREGOING IS MDOT's February 18, 2004 VERSION

MYTH: Huron Church Road in Windsor to/from The Ambassador B ridge can't be fixed; it was never the plan.